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I. INTRODUCTION 
The class action mechanism made Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts
1 possible; 
without it, no lawsuit would have been pursued, no Supreme Court decision 
provoked, no twentieth anniversary celebrated.  The defendant owed thousands 
of dispersed plaintiffs minute amounts of interest on overdue natural gas royalty 
                                                      
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.  I am grateful for helpful comments that I received from Steve 
Bainbridge, Mark Grady, Sam Issacharoff, Seana Shiffrin, and Steve Yeazell, and for the research assistance of 
Holning Lau.  I am particularly indebted to Lynn Stout for helping me think through the relationship of 
externalities, collective action, and class actions. 
1
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payments.  With the value of their claims outweighed by the costs of pursuing 
them, most of these plaintiffs, the Supreme Court observed,Awould have no 
realistic day in court if a class action were not available.@
2  But it was and they 
did.  The class action mechanism enabled Athe plaintiffs to pool claims which 
would be uneconomical to litigate individually,@
3 explained then-Associate 
Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court. 
Embedded in this common account of the small claims case are two preva-
lent ideas about the class action mechanism:  that it enables litigation by 
gathering plaintiffs together so that they can actively pool their claims and that 
the reason it does so is, figuratively speaking, to assure the plaintiffs= Aday in 
court,@ or literally, to recoup the plaintiffs= losses.  Of course, neither of these 
conventions is quite right:  as the Shutts Court itself later acknowledges,
4 
plaintiffs in small claims class actions do nothing, they do that nothing far from 
the courtroom, and what they collect is likely to be about as close to nothing as 
was the effort they put in to collecting it.  Nonetheless, like Shutts, most class 
action law tends to justify the device by reference to the plaintiffs= plight and as a 
means of vindicating the plaintiffs= interests.  An important strain of the scholarly 
literature incorporates similar emphases.  Scholars have demonstrated that the 
small claims class faces what economists call a Acollective action problem@ and 
they have applauded the class mechanism as the means by which the class 
overcomes this problem.
5 
My goal in this Article, as may already be apparent, is to suggest some 
wrinkles in the collective action story of the small claims class action.  I argue 
                                                      
2
 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812-13. 
5
 A good explication of this theory in the class action literature can be found in Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey C. Miller, The Plaintiffs= Attorney=s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic 
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).  Macey and Miller state that A[t]he 
class action is a tool for overcoming the free-rider and other collective action problems that impair any attempt 
to organize a large number of discrete individuals in any common project.@  Id.  at 8.  See also, Alexandra 
Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 70 (2003) (stating A[a]mong 
other things, class actions solve the collection action problems faced by individuals with claims too small to be 
economically adjudicated individually . . .@); Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A 
Case Study of Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 563 (1996) (stating, 
in a section entitled AThe Theory of Collective Action and Class Actions,@ A[t]he class action device is an 
attempt to overcome the problem of dispersed injured parties whose damage claims are sufficiently small that 
they lack incentives to pursue individual litigation.  Absent the class action device, collective action problems 
can prevent the aggregation of individual claims into one action that would support economically viable 
litigation.@); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A 
Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 427 (1993) (stating Athe class action aims to overcome the collective 
action problems inherent in any effort to organize a large group of individuals into one common project@). 
On the instances of collectives within the litigation system more generally, see Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43 (1989). 2004]  A POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THEORY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION  3 
 
both that the means is not quite what the account=s name implies and that the end 
is not just what the account=s content suggests.  But I come to praise this form of 
representative litigation, not to bury it.  I therefore offer a new defense of the 
small claims class action, one based not on the collective action theory but on the 
related concept of positive externalities.
6  The class action mechanism is 
important not just because it enables a group of litigants to conquer a collective 
action problem and secure relief, but also B perhaps more so B because it 
produces external benefits for society.
7  It is these spillover effects, these 
externalities, that are under-produced in the small claims setting in the absence of 
the class form.  By explicating this externalities theory of the small claims class 
action, my goal is not to displace but to supplement the collective action theory.
8 
The externalities theory supplements the collective action theory because it 
explicates the ends that class actions serve, not just the means for accomplishing 
those ends.
9  Moreover, like the collective action theory, the externalities theory 
employs economic insights to illuminate our understanding of litigation.  The 
theories complement one another because they are both tethered to the economic 
conundrum presented by so-called Apublic goods.@  The phrase Apublic goods@ is 
meant to describe goods that governments must provide because private profit-
oriented markets are unlikely to do so.  Markets have difficulty producing public 
                                                      
6
 An Aexternality is defined as a cost or benefit that the voluntary actions of one or more people imposes or 
confers on a third party or parties without their consent.@  R OBERT  COOTER  &  THOMAS  ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 45 (1988).  A negative externality Aresults when the activity of one person . . . imposes a cost on 
someone else.@  JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 42 (2d ed. 2000).  "Positive 
externalities occur when the activities of an individual . . . result in benefits, the value of which the producer is 
unable to internalize or enjoy.@  Id.  at 46.  The concept of externalities is generally traced to the British 
economist A. C. Pigou, who in 1920 stated that externalities are created by exchange when: 
  [O]ne person A, in the course of rendering some service, for which payment is made, to the 
second person B, incidentally also renders services or disservice to other persons . . . of such a sort 
that payment cannot be exacted from the benefited parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the 
injured parties. 
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183 (1
st ed. 1920). 
7
 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 530-31 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing social benefits 
of litigation beyond dispute resolution). 
8
 The one scholarly article discussing class actions and externalities is Gerald A. Wright=s Note, The Cost-
Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1968-1969).  Wright generally uses Aexternal-
ities@ to refer to the negative externalities underlying the legal case B of, for example, pollution B and does not 
use the language of externalities to refer, as I do, to litigation itself. 
9
 The Acollective action@ scholarship is relatively indifferent as to the goals of class cases.  See, e.g., Macey 
& Miller, supra note 4, at 11.  Generally, though, the law and economics focus of this literature emphasizes the 
compensatory rather than deterrent aims of class suits by insisting that the class attorney is the agent for the 
immediate class members themselves and not for some larger social good.  For an explanation and critique, see 
William B. Rubenstein, On What A Private Attorney General Is B And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 
2161-2167 (2004).  As I note there, id.  at 2165 n.126, David Rosenberg=s work uniquely emphasizes the 
deterrent ends of class action litigation in the mass torts context.  As I argue below, see supra Part IV, 
litigation's positive externalities exceed both simple compensation and simple deterrence; therefore the theory I 
offer here does more than elaborate a deterrence theory of class actions. 4  A POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THEORY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION  [Vol. : 
 
goods because of two defining characteristics of such goods B  Ajointness of 
supply and impossibility of exclusion.@
10  The example of a lighthouse helps 
illuminate these two characteristics: one person=s use of its signal in no way 
diminishes anyone else=s (jointness of supply) and  it is generally impossible to 
provide a lighthouse to some at sea while excluding others (impossibility of 
exclusion).  Private parties are therefore unlikely to invest in lighthouse 
construction: entrepreneurs are daunted by the impossibility of profiting, while 
for those needing the product, it seems rational to wait for someone else to pay 
and then to free-ride on the inevitable positive externality of her purchase.  The 
inevitability of the positive externality exacerbates the collective action 
problem.
11  
When scholars and judges argue that the class action mechanism solves a 
collective action problem what they are saying is that the mechanism makes 
possible the production of a good that would not otherwise be produced.  That 
good is a lawsuit.  As I explain in more detail below, litigation can be conceptu-
alized as a public good, its pursuit produces positive externalities, and litigants in 
group-like situations therefore have incentives to free ride; where the individual 
stakes are low, this collective action problem is particularly acute.  It is not 
illogical that scholars have focused on the collective action aspect of the problem 
when describing the class action, as representative litigation provides the needed 
solution.  But the externality theory adds to the literature by supplementing this 
discussion of how the class action solves the problem with an emphasis on why 
the problem requires attention, why, that is, we need to create litigation.  The 
externality theory appreciates the class action as a means, to be sure, but 
envisions its ends as encompassing spillover effects far beyond immediate 
plaintiff compensation.  While the collective action theory tells us how to get the 
lighthouse built, the externality theory B like a good Los Angeleno B admires the 
quality of the light. 
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 See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (Dorothy Sawicki ed., 1982) (AIf a good is in joint 
supply, one person=s consumption of it does not reduce the amount available to anyone else. . . If a good is 
characterized by impossibility of exclusion, it is impossible to prevent relevant people from consuming it.@). 
11
 For centuries, economists employed lighthouses as a prime example of a public good.  But then in 1974, 
Ronald Coase argued that in fact lighthouses had often been produced by private parties.  See R.H. Coase, The 
Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. LAW & ECON. 357 (1974), reprinted in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, 
AND THE LAW 187 (1988).  In response to Coase=s article, David van Zandt helpfully clarified that lighthouses B 
like all goods B are produced through a combination of private markets and governmental action, though the 
precise mix of the public and private varies depending upon the characteristics of the goods in questions.  David 
E. Van Zandt, The Lessons of the Lighthouse: AGovernment@ or APrivate@ Provision of Goods, XXII J. LEGAL 
STUD. 47 (1993).  Dean Van Zandt=s article demonstrates that B whether or not the label Apublic good@ is at all 
helpful B the nondepletable and nonexcludable characteristics of lighthouses means that their erection may 
require modes of public involvement that are distinct from public interactions with markets for depletable and 
excludable goods.  I therefore employ the jargon of Apublic goods@ and the example of Alighthouses@ throughout 
the Article consciously, using these as shorthand for nothing more than the distinctive characteristics of such 
goods; I do not mean to imply that only the government can produce such goods, nor, conversely, that there is 
elsewhere a market completely free of public involvement. 2004]  A POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THEORY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION  5 
 
II.  SHUTTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
At first blush, Shutts exemplifies the dynamics of a small claims class ac-
tion.  The plaintiffs alleged that a single defendant economically harmed, in a 
similar fashion, thousands of individuals across all fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, and several foreign countries.
12  If the harm alleged were indeed 
unlawful, each of these individuals would become a plaintiff with a meritorious 
cause of action.  Yet, because each plaintiff’s claim was so insubstantial, no 
plaintiff had a stake that justified hiring an attorney for an hourly wage, nor 
would any attorney see a sufficient contingent fee justifying individual litigation.  
In addition, each plaintiff had some incentive to do nothing and wait for someone 
else to do something, then to freely ride upon the defendant’s change of policy or 
the issue preclusive potential of the initial judgment. 
The class action mechanism solves this problem by pooling the plaintiffs’ 
claims together into one case and enabling the class attorney to take a fee out of 
the whole recovery, rather than out of one individual’s recovery.
13  Because 
everyone’s take is thereby reduced, no one is riding for free.  It is oft-repeated 
that the class action provides this solution, but in fact the class action mechanism 
works in harmony with fee rules to provide a solution:  collective claims without 
a collective fee would do far less to solve the problem than would a collective fee 
without collective claims.  The fee rules essentially establish a mechanism for 
taxing each class member her share of the costs in exchange for her share of the 
recovery.
14  While no class member’s share of the costs alone produces litigation, 
the collective shares of all the class members comfortably cover the attorneys’ 
fees. 
If the first common misstatement of the small claims theory relies on the 
form without reference to the fee, the second imagines that the small claims class 
action represents an instance of actual action among members of a collective.  
The class action mechanism may overcome a collective action problem, but it 
does not do so by motivating individuals within the group.  This is a lovely 
tension that lies hidden between the lines of the Shutts decision.  On the one 
hand, the Court acknowledges the problem of the small claims case and 
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 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799.  Phillips Petroleum’s leases were geographically centered in eleven different 
states, but the plaintiff/royalty owners were more widely dispersed.  Id. 
13
 See generally 10  CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2675 (3d ed. 
1998).  Depending upon the type of case, the fee in small claims cases can be a percentage of the fund recouped 
or it can be paid by the losing defendant pursuant to a fee-shifting statute or rule. Id.  In either case, the plaintiff 
likely bears the cost, either directly in a contingent fee case, or indirectly in  a fee-shifting case, as the 
defendant’s settlement offer to the plaintiff class is adjusted to account for the fee it must also pay the plaintiffs’ 
attorney.  
14
 For an exploration of the underlying rationale, see Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ 
Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL  L. REV. 656 (1991). 6  A POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THEORY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION  [Vol. : 
 
implicitly embraces the idea that Rule 23 solves the collective action problem.
15  
In drawing this conclusion, the Court uses the active voice, stating that class 
actions “permit the plaintiffs to pool claims,”
16 rather than employing the passive 
voice to observe that the class action permits the plaintiffs’ “claims to be 
pooled.”  The Court’s chosen locution implies that members of the class actively 
join together to pursue their common goal.  Within a few pages, however, the 
Court insists that there is no need for plaintiffs to have any geographical 
relationship to the court in which the action is pending because the plaintiffs in a 
small claims class action do nothing—they are free-riders: “[A]n absent class-
action plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the 
litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards provided 
for his protection.”
17  Moreover, in rejecting an argument that the Constitution 
compels an opt-in rather than opt-out procedure, the Court states outright that 
requiring individual action would defeat collective action: 
Requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively request inclusion would probably 
impede the prosecution of those class actions involving an aggregation 
of small individual claims, where a large number of claims are re-
quired to make it economical to bring suit.  The plaintiff's claim may 
be so small, or the plaintiff so unfamiliar with the law, that he would 
not file suit individually, nor would he affirmatively request inclusion 
in the class if such a request were required by the Constitution.
18 
What we are left with at the end of Shutts is approval for a mechanism (the 
class action) that solves a collective action problem (dispersed small claimants) 
by insisting that no one in the collective need take action.  If collective action 
problems pose a challenge to collective action, it would seem a remarkable 
solution that could achieve the group’s results by insisting on group member 
inaction.  Of course, in true small claims situations this may in fact be one of the 
many peculiar qualities of collective action problems, a question to which I turn 
in the next section. 
Before turning there, however, one last aspect of the particular dynamics of 
the collective action problem in Shutts is worth relishing.  After insisting that 
class members can do nothing, the Court acknowledges that 3,400 members, or 
10%, of the class in Shutts did do something: they opted out.
19  If the class action 
mechanism was necessary to overcome the collective action concern that no sane 
                                                      
15 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799. 
16
 Id. at 809. 
17
 Id. at 810. 
18
 Id. at 812-13 (citation omitted). 
19
 Id. at 801. 2004]  A POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THEORY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION  7 
 
person would pursue a claim worth $100, what explains why 3,400 appear to 
have done just that?  And if they did, was there ever really a collective action 
problem?  It seems that the best explanation of the defectors here is that their 
claims were not worth $100, that they were not the average stakeholders.  The 
Court’s breakdown of the geographic location of the leases (done for purposes of 
its choice-of-law analysis) reveals that the claims appear to be of quite diverse 
sizes.
20   For example, in one class, 2,653 royalty owners in Oklahoma were 
owed $83,711 in royalties, or about $32 per royalty owner.
21  In that same class, 
1,244 royalty owners in Louisiana were owed $2,187,548, or about $1,758 per 
royalty owner.
22  Given that the claims in Shutts were about the interest owed on 
these royalties, even the larger Louisiana stake holders would not seem to have 
enough at stake to opt out of the class.  But they did.
23 
Regardless of why 3,400 claimants opted out, these data demonstrate the 
heterogeneity of the class members’ claims.  This very heterogeneity could well 
have been a solution to the collective action problem: the claimants with 
significant enough claims to opt out theoretically had significant enough claims 
to litigate on their own.
24  If so, they were well-situated to be champions for the 
rest of the class,
25 who could reasonably free ride on their cases.
26 
Commentators tell us that Shutts is a small claims case presenting a classic 
collective action problem, but that may not be precisely right.   The Supreme 
                                                      
20 Id. at 815 n.6. 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. 
23
 It is possible that those who opted out had some connection to a different attorney hoping to put together 
a class action—and secure the fee of it—in a different jurisdiction.  Such disgruntled  attorneys are often the 
source of objections to class action settlements.  See William B. Rubenstein,  A Transactional Model of 
Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 373 (2001) (hereinafter “Transactional Model”). 
24
 This is essentially the solution to the collective action problem of securities classes that Congress 
enacted in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1-78j-1 (2005) 
(authorizing plaintiffs with large interests to be lead plaintiffs, conduct the case, and chose counsel for the 
class.).  Elsewhere, I have questioned what might motivate such claimants to go through the motions of filing 
class suits where their interests appear significant enough to sustain individual lawsuits.  See Rubenstein, 
Transactional Model, supra note 21, at 399-400. 
25
 Heterogeneity of the claims could, in theory, present typicality problems for large claimants proposed to 
represent small claimants.  See generally Rubenstein, Transactional Model,  supra note 21, at 393-403.   
However, given the straightforward financial nature of the legal issues in Shutts, the heterogeneity of claims did 
not present the type of typicality problems that characterize large claim personal injury cases.  See Shutts, 472 
U.S. at 808-09 n.1 (noting that the named plaintiffs adequately represent the class and “all members of the class 
have the same interest in enforcing their claims against the defendant”). 
26
 If the large claimants established a recovery fund, presumably the costs of their attorneys could be 
shared throughout the class via common law fee sharing principles.  See, e.g., Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. of Ga. 
v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1884); Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1881);  Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 
307 U.S. 161 (1938).  See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra 13 note , at 322-23 (discussing “a common fund 
doctrine”). 8  A POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THEORY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION  [Vol. : 
 
Court tells us in Shutts that class certification is necessary to overcome that 
collective action problem, but that may not be precisely right.  The Supreme 
Court also tells us in Shutts that the class action solves this collective action 
problem because the plaintiffs actively pool their claims and because the 
plaintiffs do nothing—two conclusions that seem to stand in inherent contradic-
tion to one another.  To understand these strands of collective action problems 
and their applicability to small claims class action requires a quick dip in the 
ocean of material known as the collective action literature. 
III. THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION AS A COLLECTIVE 
ACTION PROBLEM 
The primogenitor of the collective action literature, Mancur Olson, used the 
phrase “collective action” in reference “to any problem that provides benefits 
and/or costs for more than one individual, so that some coordination of efforts is 
required.”
27  Collective action questions are therefore questions about groups, 
group efforts, and the conditions under which groups form.
28  To conceptualize 
the small claims class action as a collective action problem is to ponder the fate 
of the group of plaintiffs as a group.  The collective action inquiry originates in 
the observation that no member of the group appears to have a sufficient 
incentive to act for the group.  From this perspective, the problem of the small 
claims class action is that the group’s collective interests will not be pursued 
precisely because the claims are so small.  The group will be inactive. 
Interestingly, the collective action literature did not develop in response to 
group inaction, but rather in reaction to the seemingly peculiar reality of group 
action.  Mid-twentieth century social policy across a variety of disciplines 
posited group-based activities.
29  For economists, the formation of labor unions 
and their pursuit of workers’ interests provided an important aspect of modeling 
                                                      
27
 TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 9 (1992).  See also Macey & Miller, 
supra note 7, at 8 n.6 (stating “collective action is used in the public choice literature to refer to any procedure 
for making decisions by groups of people”) (citing IAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION 11 
(1987)). 
28
 As Russell Hardin explains: 
The logic of collective action is not a theory about interest group organizations.  Rather it is a theory about 
whether there will be interest group organizations or any other kind of collective action.  A group theory of 
politics might take interest group organizations for granted and go on from there to explain certain political 
outcomes.  The general explanation of collective action starts with individual motivations in determining what 
kinds of collective actions are likely to be undertaken and what kinds are not. 
HARDIN, supra note 11, at 14-15. 
29 MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL 
RIGIDITIES 17 (1982) (hereinafter “RISE AND DECLINE”). 2004]  A POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THEORY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION  9 
 
economic behavior.
30  For political scientists, special interest group bargaining in 
the legislative arena provided the key to understanding democratic governance.
31 
At the heart of all these models laid an unexamined assumption: if individu-
als possessed shared interests, they would join together to form a group to pursue 
these collective interests.  In his seminal work, The Logic of Collective Action,
32 
Olson demonstrated the illogic of that assumption. Olson showed that for most 
special interest groups, each individual’s stake is quite small, while the costs of 
learning enough to act, and then acting, typically outweigh the benefits.
33  
Moreover, since the benefits would necessarily be shared by everyone in the 
group if anyone in the group secured them (meaning that the benefits are public 
goods), each group member has an incentive to not act, to free ride.
34  The 
conundrum Olson pondered was how to square the illogic of any individual 
acting for the group with the reality that many groups fitting this description— 
from special interest groups to government itself—actually do exist.
35  Why and 
how did these groups form?  How is it that existing groups appear to have 
overcome the collective action problem, the illogic of acting collectively? 
The answer Olson identified is that groups form and pursue their interests, 
even though it is illogical for individuals in the group to do so, for reasons 
“other  than the collective goods that governments and other organizations 
provide.”
36  In other words, large groups do not exist because individuals have 
joined them to realize the small returns they will receive from concerted activity.  
Groups of people exist for other reasons.  Olson identified five.  First, some 
groups, like governments, exist through coercion, not voluntary individual 
joinder.
37  Second, some voluntary organizations exist where there are “selective 
incentives,” collateral benefits or penalties that encourage membership more than 
                                                      
30 Id. 
31
 Id.  As Mancur Olson explained: 
Thus many students of politics in the United States for a long time supposed that citizens with a common 
political interest would organize and lobby to serve that interest.  Each individual in the population would be in 
one or more groups and the vector of pressures of these competing groups explained the outcomes of the 
political process.  Similarly, it was often assumed that if workers, farmers, or consumers faced monopolies 
harmful to their interests, they would eventually attain countervailing power through organizations such as labor 
unions or farm organizations that obtained market power and protective government action. 
Id. 
32
 The full title is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOOD AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS (1965).  The importance of Olson’s work is hard to overstate.  See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 25, at 
1 (In “the last quarter-century, few books in economics have achieved the wide-ranging, lasting, and profound 
impact of The Logic of Collective Action.”). 
33 OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 28. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36
 OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 27, at 20. 
37
 Id. at 20-21. 10  A POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THEORY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION  [Vol. : 
 
does the incentive of the particular collective gain.
38  Individuals join the 
automobile club for its free towing service, a positive selective incentive, but 
thereby create a special interest group for car drivers.  Workers may have 
traditionally joined labor unions to avoid harassment by union leaders, a negative 
selective incentive.  Third, Olson identified and isolated positive and negative 
social incentives as a unique form of selective incentives that encourage group 
membership in smaller, localized groups, though typically not in large, amor-
phous, nationwide ones.
39 Fourth, Olson posited that collective action can occur 
in “situations in which there are only  a few individuals or firms that would 
benefit from collective action,” thus that collective action will sometimes take 
place in small groups without the necessity of selective incentives.
40  Finally, 
Olson posited that collective action could take place in groups where the group 
members had differently-sized interests.
41  Such groups might be “privileged,” in 
that one member of the group would have benefits from pursuit of the group’s 
interests that outweighed her costs and could therefore be expected to act on 
behalf of the group; typically this is a group member with the largest stake.
42 
Summarizing, Olson concluded that “groups that have access to selective 
incentives will be more likely to act collectively to obtain collective goods than 
those that do not, and that smaller groups will have a greater likelihood of being 
engaged in collective action than larger ones.”
43  Olson maintained that the 
relatively small number of individuals who join large groups -- e.g., taxpayer, 
consumer, environmental, or welfare organizations -- provided empirical proof of 
his theoretical insight.
44  The critical fact about these groups is they are “so 
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The censure or even ostracism of those who fail to bear a share of the burdens of collective action can 
sometimes be an important selective incentive. . . . Similarly, those in a socially interactive group seeking a 
collective good can give special respect or honor to those who distinguish themselves by their sacrifices in the 
interest of the group and thereby offer them a positive selective incentive.  Since most people apparently prefer 
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Id. 
40
 Id. at 29-30. 
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42
 Even if this large stakeholder’s benefits do not outweigh her costs,  and the group is therefore not 
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dispersed that it is not feasible for any non-governmental organization to coerce 
them,”
45 unlike workers in a single factory; nor are either positive selective 
incentives or social incentives available.
46 
Olson’s hypothesis about collective action fits the small claims class action.  
As Olson would predict, given the small stake of each claimant, the significant 
costs of acting, the ability to free-ride, and the dispersed nature of the large 
impersonal group, no individuals will voluntarily act to pursue the group’s 
interests.  No group will form.  Moreover, the voluntary methods for overcoming 
this collective action problem are inapplicable.  Social incentives cannot work 
because individuals are too dispersed to be in social contact with one another.  
Voluntary selective incentives are unlikely to work as well: the closest the law 
comes to providing free towing in exchange for group membership is the 
incentive payments to class representatives in class actions.
47  While such 
incentive payments might induce action on behalf of the group, it is unlikely any 
group member would even know of such an incentive and even more unlikely 
that individuals would organize their economic lives around securing class 
representative incentive payments.  Typically, these payments appear ex post, not 
ex ante, and are given for time spent on the lawsuit, not for having thought to 
organize it.  Moreover, in true collective action situations, the selective incentives 
are provided to many group members so as to generate a group, not to one or a 
few group members so as to generate a champion. 
The only plausible mechanisms for inducing group action in small claims 
cases are coercive, and class action law presently employs two:  first, class 
members are coerced into joining the group by the fact that the class action 
extinguishes their claims;
48 and second, class members are coercively taxed the 
costs of the collective endeavor, depending on the fee setting, either by the 
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contingent fee their attorney extracts or by the defendant lowering its settlements 
offer to the class by the amount it must separately pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys.
49 
While the small claims class action thereby conquers the collective action 
problem, several characteristic features of this achievement can now be deline-
ated.  First, although the small claims class action solves the collective action 
problem, it does not result in collective action.  No group is formed.  A grouping 
of claims occurs, to be sure, but this is not, pace Shutts, the same thing as a group 
of people pooling their claims.  Because no group of people is formed, the class 
in the small claims class action never itself encounters any of the costs or benefits 
of group activity.  Individuals in the group do not meet one another, trade stories 
or ideas, or raise consciousness.  The group confronts no organizational issues 
central to normal groups: it does not have to develop internal governance rules or 
bylaws; it need not identify and select leaders nor develop a means for doing so; 
it does not have to keep membership records, collect dues, police the boundaries 
of who is in and who is out.  The small claims class is a void, not a group. 
Second, not only does no group form, but no group member is even respon-
sible for the grouping of claims that does occur:  an external third party, the class' 
counsel, groups the claims.  She is able to do this because the law imposes a 
coercive grouping on the class members through the preclusion and fee mecha-
nisms.  This coercive grouping is therefore distinct from the coercion that attends 
union or synagogue membership, both of which are typically compelled by group 
members themselves.  This coercion is more like coerced government taxation.  
But even that is an imprecise metaphor because at least with respect to coerced 
government taxation, the taxed can vote the bums out.  Ideally, the class 
representative can control and fire class counsel, but this ideal exists in a 
theoretical realm far removed from the practice of complex litigation.  Even 
where a majority of class members do appear and object to a settlement, their 
numbers are not necessarily controlling.
50  The third party who groups the class’s 
claims exerts near total control over the group-that-does-not-exist.  To make 
matters even worse, she often does so with her own interests—her fee—
conflicting with the interests of the class members she represents.
51 
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Third, it is predictable that no group member will attempt to form a group 
and that no group will actually form since it is legal claims that the group 
members have in common with one another.  The absence of group-based 
activity underscores that litigation in the United States is decidedly individualis-
tic in nature.
52  Our procedural rules imagine lawsuits as individual pursuits and 
vest control of a cause of action in an individual; while joinder is generally 
welcomed at a transactional level, it is exceptional and must be justified by 
reference to specific rules
53-- and even then, the individual litigant retains 
adjudicative control.  It is remarkably rare that individuals themselves—not 
through an attorney’s work—form a  group for the purpose of sharing the costs 
of pursuing a joint legal cause.  The closest analogy may be the activities of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund in the Brown era.  But of course the group members 
there came together for the political purpose of supporting one another and their 
common cause,
54 not simply for the economic purpose of sharing their litigation 
costs.  Given the pervasively individualistic nature of American adjudication, it is 
not surprising that individuals possessing small legal claims generally do not 
think to contact one another, jointly hire counsel, and share litigation costs -- 
even in this age where the internet significantly reduces the transaction costs of 
doing so. 
In the small claims case, there is neither a group itself, nor any real control 
by any particular group member.  If the collective action literature is interested in 
the study of when groups form to pursue their interests, there is not much to 
study in the small claims class action.  Small claims class actions are a form of 
externally-coerced collective taxing, a subset of collective action but not one 
involving the collective activity of a group.  No coordination of effort occurs 
among class members in the small claims class. 
The collective action heuristic is helpful in making sense of the small 
claims case because this conceptualization identifies that absent particular forms 
of government intervention, the litigation marketplace will not generate legal 
claims sufficient to redress plaintiffs’ harms and protect their interests.  It is the 
government action of Rule 23 and fee shifting rules, though, not the activities of 
any class members, that solve this collective action problem.  Specialized 
government market interventions are called for in situations of market failure, 
such as those involving externalities.  Perhaps this presents a better, if not a 
distinct, way of conceptualizing small claims cases. 
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IV. THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION AS A POSITIVE 
EXTERNALITY PROBLEM 
The externality conceptualization of the small claims class action focuses 
not only on why an individual litigant would not rationally file suit, but 
additionally, and perhaps more importantly, on the social costs of that lost 
opportunity.  Litigation may provide benefits for the parties to the action -- a 
plaintiff’s recovery, a defendant’s dismissal, a settlement exchanging money for 
repose -- but lawsuits can also produce value for those not parties to the 
particular case.  Economists label these social benefits “positive externalities” 
and teach that such externalities are likely to be under-produced.  In the 
following paragraphs, I will develop an account of litigation externalities and 
then attempt to show how this account provides insight into the conventional 
understanding of class action lawsuits.
55 
The economic account of litigation begins with the proposition that a law-
suit represents a transaction and a legal system is a market(place) for such 
transactions.
56  This is true of litigated cases, but the point becomes especially 
obvious in a legal system that primarily produces negotiated settlements.
57  In a 
lawsuit, a plaintiff trades her claim for money, the defendant trades its money for 
finality; the lawsuit is a transaction in which res judicata is bought and sold.
58  It 
may seem odd that disputants would come to a courthouse rather than just 
settling the dispute privately.  However, plaintiffs turn to law because bargaining 
within an adjudicative framework serves at least two important functions.  First, 
the possibility of a third-party providing a judgment gives leverage to the person 
filing suit.
59  Second, litigation provides the plaintiff with a formal mechanism 
for obtaining factual information; this levels out information asymmetries that 
                                                      
55
 I am not, of course, the first person to utilize economic analyses of the class case.  For an overview of 
the vast literature, see ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 261-65 
(2003).  Nonetheless, as noted at the outset, nothing in this literature discusses small claims class actions in 
terms of positive externalities.  See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text. 
56
 I have argued elsewhere that complex class actions can be conceptualized as transactions.  Rubenstein, 
Transactional Model, supra note 21, passim.  I adapt that argument here to apply to all lawsuits. 
57
 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the 
Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997) (stating that 90-95% of cases that are not dismissed before trial 
end in settlement). 
58
 See Rubenstein, Transactional Model, supra note 21, at 419 n.213 (stating “[in a lawsuit] what is bought 
and sold are rights to sue”).  When a judicial decision is rendered, that too can be conceptualized as a 
transaction—res judicata is exchanged for money—though one ordered by the court. 
59
 See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 2004]  A POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THEORY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION  15 
 
might otherwise preclude settlements (i.e., deals) from being made.
60  Litigation 
promotes contract/agreement/settlement primarily through information exchange 
and the risk of an adverse judicial decision. 
 If litigation is a transaction, a properly structured litigation system should 
produce an efficient quantity of litigation.  What constitutes the efficient level of 
litigation could be viewed in Pareto optimal terms: every exchange (lawsuit) that 
would better both parties without making anyone else worse off should take 
place; if precisely this amount of litigation—no more, no less—occurs, the 
litigation system has achieved Pareto optimality.
61  If litigation exchanges take 
place that benefit the parties but harm third parties, this spillover effect, or 
negative externality, demonstrates that the system is not in a Pareto optimal state; 
one might say it has exceeded it by producing too many detrimental exchanges.  
Conversely, if trades can still be made that would benefit parties without making 
anyone worse off and such transactions are not taking place, the system is also 
not in a Pareto optimal state; one might say it has not reached it by failing to 
produce enough beneficial exchanges.  The absence of Pareto optimality 
constitutes market failure and market failure justifies some new form of 
government intervention.
62 
Most typically, the government intervenes in markets to interrupt negative 
externalities; less frequently, government intervenes to encourage positive 
externalities.
63  Negative externalities are more likely to exist than positive ones 
for the simple reason that these costs are not borne by the parties to the transac-
tion; as such, they do not operate to deter transactions unless there is a mecha-
nism for internalizing them, that is, unless the transacting parties experience these 
costs and pay them.  For example, passengers and airlines transact with one 
another for transportation services, but one spillover effect of airline travel is the 
noise that is created for homeowners in the vicinity of the airport.
64  If the parties 
have to pay these costs, airline travel will be made more costly.
65  Internalizing 
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the negative externalities results in fewer transactions.
66  Positive externalities are 
likely to be under-produced because the parties to the transactions that produce 
them do not directly reap their benefits.
67  If at least some of the value of the 
positive externality can be internalized, it will  encourage more transactions that 
then produce more positive externalities.
68 
The class action represents a governmental intervention into the market of 
legal claims.  Absent the availability of the class form, litigants are capable of 
buying and selling only their own rights.  What the government does through the 
class action mechanism is authorize one litigant to transact other litigants’ causes 
of action.  The government generally offers this authorization in a handful of 
situations captured by Rule 23(b).  As I argue more fully elsewhere,
69 all the 
various types of class cases can be understood as necessitated by the externalities 
of individual litigation.  This is perhaps simplest to see in situations of negative 
externalities.  In a limited fund class case, for example, individual lawsuits 
produce spillover effect on persons not parties:  by depleting the defendant’s 
available resources, the early individual cases harm later litigants.  The class 
action solves this problem of negative externalities by internalizing them.  The 
class action takes the spillover effect, the burden of scarce resources, and shares 
that burden among all of the claimants, including the early ones.
70 
The small claims class action does not immediately appear to fit this para-
digm.  Individual lawsuits do not produce negative externalities because there are 
no individual lawsuits.  No class member has enough at stake to file suit.  Yet the 
small claims situation can be conceptualized in externalities terms:  the absence 
of individual lawsuits represents market failure because the market has produced 
too few, not too many, transactions.  The absence of individual cases under-
produces  positive externalities.  The class form represents a government 
intervention in the individual litigation market aimed at producing small claims 
cases so as to generate the positive externalities of such lawsuits. 
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But why?  What are the positive social benefits of $100 lawsuits that are 
lost in the small claims situation?   What are the positive externalities that flow 
from individual litigation?  Most generally, as Judge Posner explains, litigation 
“establishes rules of conduct designed to shape future conduct, not only the 
present disputants’ but also other people’s.”
71   These “rules of conduct” 
constitute goods with the attributes of public goods:  the rules of conduct are not 
diminished when used and no individual can be excluded from using them.  I 
return to the public good nature of a lawsuit below,
72 but before doing so, it is 
important to sketch out in more depth than does Judge Posner's comment the 
precise nature of the good itself.  Thus, more specifically, the positive external-
ities of individual lawsuits can be grouped into four sets of effects: 1) decree 
effects; 2) settlement effects; 3) threat effects; and 4) institutional effects. 
Individual lawsuits resulting in judicial decisions produce external decree 
effects.  The legal principle developed in the case will create more certainty in 
structuring social behavior and lower the need for future adjudication concerning 
the decided issue.  If future litigation does arise, the decree from the initial case 
will serve as stare decisis, hence making resolution of later cases more efficient.  
Beyond these general legal effects, the decree in the initial case could also be 
used to preclude re-litigation of factual issues in future cases among the same or 
similarly situated litigants.  And most immediately, the decree may actually 
require a party to cease a practice affecting a group of individuals, even though 
the initial case was prosecuted by only one of them.  An individual lawsuit that 
produces a judicial decision thereby has generated significant social benefits in 
terms of shaping conduct, reducing litigation costs, and preserving judicial 
resources.
73 
Individual lawsuits resulting in settlements, not judicial decisions, may 
nonetheless have similar positive externalities as settlement effects.  To pick up 
where the last list left off:   if one litigant successfully challenges a policy that 
affects many persons, a defendant may agree to change its behavior as to the 
entire class.   Even if a defendant does not agree as a formal matter to change its 
general policy as a consequence of the initial case, it may nonetheless do so 
informally lest it be faced with repeated lawsuits.  This would especially be true 
if a group of plaintiffs is closely associated with one another or share legal 
counsel -- in such a situation, information about the initial settlement can easily 
be passed among similarly situated parties who can then use it to their advantage.  
The converse is true as well: shared information about a weak settlement may 
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deter future litigants.  Similarly, settlements by some defendants within an 
industry could encourage other defendant/competitors to settle.  The information 
externalities of settlements are well known and account for much of the attempt 
to both publicize and keep confidential such information.
74  In sum, settlements, 
as well as judicial decrees, produce positive externalities:  they change behavior 
beyond the parties to the initial suit; they reduce future litigation costs by 
establishing settlement ranges; and they preserve judicial resources. 
The very threat of individual litigation, absent settlement or decree, may 
also produce positive social benefits.  The risk of litigation is a cost that parties 
must factor into decision-making in any sphere.  The most familiar example is 
that of tort law, where it is said that the costs of accidents, including the litigation 
costs and legal remedies, structure social decision-making.
75  The same could be 
said of the contracting and property realms as well.  In undertaking a cost-benefit 
analysis, a party would logically consider both the risk of losing litigation and 
the risk that such litigation will actually be filed.  If the latter factor is small, it 
will increase the likelihood a party will engage in the behavior.
76  The small 
claims case presents a perfect example.  A large corporation can bilk many 
individuals a very small amount, realizing significant gains without fearing that 
litigation will follow.  The very possibility of litigation would change this 
analysis significantly.  Therefore, the threat effects inherent in individual 
lawsuits produce positive externalities. 
Finally, the institutional result of the class action mechanism and related fee 
provisions is the development of a private group of law enforcers.
77  By enabling 
litigation, the class action has the structural consequence of dividing law 
enforcement among public agencies and private attorneys general and of shifting 
a significant amount of that enforcement to the private sector.  This is an 
important benefit if in fact private enforcement is, as often argued, more efficient 
than public enforcement.  Even if private enforcement generates its own 
problems (such as the agency costs that inhere in class actions), nonetheless "the 
sheer diversity of enforcers should generate more innovations than a monopolis-
tic government enforcer would produce."
78  These structural effects are not the 
immediate purpose of any particular piece of class action litigation, yet they are 
critical externalities of class suits. 
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Because the settlement, decree, or threat resulting from one individual law-
suit --  and its likely enforcement by a private attorney general -- will often 
compel a defendant to change its behavior, that lawsuit creates positive external-
ities.  Conventionally, the small claims case is thought to vindicate the interests 
of the individual class members whose harms are so small individually, yet so 
large collectively.  The externality story defends the class suit not just in terms of 
the benefits to the litigants themselves, but also in terms of the spillover effects 
small claims cases will have for society more generally.  It is from society’s 
perspective, not just that of the plaintiffs, that we lament the underproduction of 
individual small claim lawsuits:  we weep not just for them but for us. 
V. WHY THE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY APPROACH IS HELPFUL 
When the legal system is conceptualized as a market for legal claims, it be-
comes apparent that the product of the individual lawsuit has the characteristics 
attributed to public goods:  all members of society share the good without 
depleting it and none can be excluded from doing so.  Tragically, therefore, no 
class member has any incentive to bring the case.  This is the collective action 
dilemma which results in the underproduction of the positive externality.  Small 
claims situations at once pose a collective action problem and a problem of the 
underproduction of positive externalities. 
While the two concepts are closely intertwined, the class action literature 
has framed class suits, particularly small claim class suits, almost exclusively in 
the language of collective action.  There is little that describes or conceptualizes 
the problem in terms of externalities.  The benefits of adding such a conceptuali-
zation to the literature include the following. 
First, as I demonstrated in Part III, the collective action moniker is a bit of a 
misnomer.  Those conversant with the collective action literature appreciate that 
coerced taxation is a response to a collective action problem and can appreciate 
the dilemma and solution in these terms.  However, to a wider audience familiar 
with the representative nature of class actions, it may seem peculiar or confusing 
to describe the class action in terms of collective action.  The risk of such 
confusion only grows as the explanation is proffered to a truly lay audience:  they 
at once learn that a class action solves a collective action problem and that class 
members therefore do nothing.  While this sounds like a semantic problem, my 
sense is that it pervades both popular and legal understandings of class actions; 
most observers, including lawyers and judges, believe that a class case involves a 
group of people descending on the courthouse en masse and most fail to 
appreciate that in fact representative litigation is precisely the opposite.  The 
collective action conceptualization furthers this misunderstanding by implying 
that because it solves a collection action problem, the class action enables 
collective action to occur. 
Second, the collective action conceptualization suggests that the primary 
value of the class suit is the benefits to those in the collective that flow from Rule 
23’s brilliant resolution of the collective action problem.  By contrast, the 20  A POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES THEORY OF THE SMALL CLAIMS CLASS ACTION  [Vol. : 
 
positive externality story suggests that what are lost absent litigation are benefits 
exceeding those provided to the parties themselves.  It is true that in a narrow 
sense the positive externalities of one class member’s lawsuit are the benefits that 
flow to the other members of the class (those who share the lighthouse).  But as I 
demonstrated in Part IV, the externalities of litigation may be felt by a wider 
range of citizens than those involved in the current controversy.  The lawsuit 
might develop legal principles, change industry practices, or conserve judicial 
and social resources.  The collective action/externality distinction could be seen 
as analogous to the compensation/deterrence distinction.
79  The collective action 
story about the small claims case is one about how to secure benefits for those in 
the collective who have been bilked.
80  The externality story is one about how to 
secure the deterrent effects of litigation.  But the externality story can be read 
even more broadly in that the externalities described in Part IV exceed simple 
deterrence. 
Third, the externality approach re-frames the discussion of the general 
shortcoming of class actions.  Conventionally, these are described in agency cost 
terms as the strike suit and the sell-out:  the former is a case with no merit settled 
too high, while the latter is a case with merit settled too low.
81  From a market 
externality perspective, the strike suit is a transaction that should not have taken 
place, the overproduction of positive externalities, a lighthouse built in a 
landlocked territory.  By contrast, the sell-out creates not too many, but too few 
positive externalities; it is a shore-based lighthouse but one lacking a bulb.   
These agency costs of representative litigation remain, but their effects are 
broadened.  Not only are the class-members harmed by the strike suit or sell-out, 
but because externality production is skewed, so too is society generally.  It is 
true that the externality story does not provide a solution for these agency costs.  
But its broader focus helps amplify the need for one. 
Finally, most generally, the positive externality story about the small claims 
case lines up the rationale for this type of class action with the rationale for the 
other existing types of class cases.  Federal class action law currently encom-
passes five distinct categories of class cases: 1) those involving the risk of 
“incompatible standards” for the defendant;
82 2) those involving limited funds;
83 
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3) those involving injunctive relief;
84 4) those involving money damages where 
claims are small;
85 and 5) those involving money damages where claims are not 
small.
86  As noted earlier, I elsewhere argue that the essential organizing principle 
of all five types of class cases recognized by Rule 23 is that they each resolve 
problems concerning the spillover effects of individual lawsuits.
87  Thus, for 
example, I have already described how limited fund cases internalize the 
externalities created when, in a race to the courthouse, an individual litigant 
depletes the defendant’s resources and harms her similarly situated would-be 
litigants.
88  In a not dissimilar fashion, in large mass tort situations such as 
asbestos, the court system may be swamped with individual claims.
89  These 
claims deplete the resources society has allotted to adjudication and thus have 
negative externalities on the ability of the legal system to accomplish its social 
function.  In short, the different types of representative litigation all share one 
common characteristic:  they each respond to a particular problem created by a 
distinct failing of individualist procedure.  All class suits are necessitated not by 
collective action problems specifically, but by the more general notion of 
externalities.  Each form of the class case addresses a particular type of positive 
or negative externality problem in individualist procedure.  Conceptualizing 
small claims cases in externalities terms helps make their relationship to other 
forms of class cases clearer. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The legal claims that formed the basis of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts
90 
were meritorious, yet of relatively modest value.  Generally, these were negative 
value claims that would not have been litigated individually because the costs of 
doing so outweighed the benefits to individual litigants.  Phillips Petroleum could 
well have walked away without liability.  Conventionally, scholars describe this 
situation as posing a collective action problem and demonstrate how the class 
action mechanism works to solve that problem. 
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In this Article, I have discussed the problem of negative value claims in a 
different language.  The fact that parties will not pursue these claims is, I argue, 
an example of the underproduction of positive externalities.  Put simply: were 
individuals to litigate their small claims, these lawsuits would produce collateral 
social benefits.  The class action mechanism helps produces these benefits by 
internalizing a benefit (to class counsel) that consequently enables the lawsuits to 
be brought. 
I argue that the addition of this analysis to the scholarly literature serves 
several functions.  Among these is that it illuminates how little collective action 
really took place in Shutts, how relatively unimportant the compensatory aspects 
of the case are compared to its other social functions, and how Shutts is more like 
other types of class cases than generally presumed. 
  This last point is particularly important for in the two decades since the 
Supreme Court decided Shutts, class action practice has exploded.  Despite a 
variety of attempts to shut them down, ranging from disapproving Supreme Court 
decisions to a variety of Congressional enactments, class action lawsuits appear 
unlikely to die.  The externality story of the small claims case sets the ground-
work for a more general understanding of the common feature of class suits.  